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NOTE 
THOMPSON V. FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 
FAMILY SERVICES:  DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF THE INDIAN CHILD 
Katerina Silcox†  
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Children are a gift from the Lord” – Psalm 127:3. 
 
“Remember that your children are not your own, but are lent to you by the 
Creator.” – Mohawk Proverb 
 
In the Virginia case of Thompson v. Fairfax County Department of Family 
Services,1 the Virginia Court of Appeals declined to recognize the so-called 
“Existing Indian Family Exception” (hereinafter “EIF exception”) to the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) due to a plain text interpretation of the 
ICWA that does not support application of the exception. The appellate court 
joined a chorus of state courts recognizing that such an exception fails to 
recognize Congress’ intent in enacting the ICWA: to promote the stability 
and security of Indian tribes and families.2 In addition, rather than 
determining whether to transfer the case to a tribal court by applying 
Virginia’s best interests of the child factors, the court decided to break with 
precedent and instead introduced an immediate harm standard.3 The case 
was remanded to a trial court to determine whether the transfer to a tribal 
court would cause, or would present a substantial risk of causing, immediate 
emotional or physical damage to the child.4 
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 1. Thompson v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Fam. Servs., 62 Va. App. 350 (2013). 
 2. Id.; see generally Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–608, 92 Stat. 3069 
(1978). 
 3. Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 376. 
 4. Id. at 384. 
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Thompson continues the recent trend of courts moving away from 
judicially-created exceptions—exceptions that have helped perpetuate the 
trend of state government interference in the placement of Native American 
children that the ICWA was drafted to prevent. While these exceptions 
originally sought to protect these children’s best interests, in retrospect, they 
have caused irreparable harm in these children’s lives and have only reflected 
American cultural biases.5 Yet, even today, history seems poised to repeat 
itself as other courts weigh factors such as their state’s relevant best interests 
of the child standard in determining when a transfer of the case to a tribal 
court is appropriate. Courts throughout the country are split on the issue of 
whether the child’s best interests are at all relevant in determining which 
court has jurisdiction.   
Understandably, these courts want to make placement decisions that will 
most benefit the child in question. In doing so, transfers to tribal court are 
often denied, as transferring the case will often delay placement of the child 
in a permanent, loving home. Virginia, on the other hand, is the first state to 
propose a solution to the difficult situation in which courts find themselves 
when faced with the dual responsibility of satisfying requirements imposed 
by federal legislation and ensuring that there is as little delay as possible in 
placing a child. The longer a child is held in limbo, waiting for permanent 
placement, the greater the potential for permanent harm to that child. This 
fact is squarely at odds with the state’s duty as parens patriae to protect the 
health, safety, and welfare of the child. This case note urges other courts to 
adopt Virginia’s new standard. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Thompson presented a multifaceted sociological and legal case that must 
be viewed through the prism of prior race relations. In this case, the court 
faced two thorny legal issues posed by previous interpretations of the ICWA. 
First, the court rejected application of the EIF exception which required that 
the child in question has at some point resided in an “Indian” home in order 
for the ICWA to apply, effectively eliminating the exception in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia.6 Second, although the court continued the trend 
moving away from application of judicially-created exceptions to the ICWA, 
the Virginia court also rejected the “best interests of the child” test applied by 
most courts.7 Instead, Virginia adopted a new standard that requires the party 
                                                                                                                                      
 5. Stacy Byrd, Learning from the Past: Why Termination of a Non-Citizen Parent’s Rights 
Should Not Be Based on the Child’s Best Interests, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 323, 327 (2013). 
 6. Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 367. 
 7. Id. at 364-65. 
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opposing removal to show that removal to tribal court would cause the child 
immediate harm.8 
A. Statement of the Case 
1.  Case Facts 
B.N. was born in July of 2010. She has resided in Fairfax County, Virginia, 
since her birth, and is a domiciliary thereof for traditional jurisdictional 
purposes.9 For the first nine months of her life, she lived with her birth 
parents, Jasmine Thundershield (referred to here, as in the trial record, as 
Jasmine Vanderplas) and Minh-Sang Nguyen.10 Vanderplas is half Sioux,11 
while Nguyen is of Vietnamese descent.12 The Bureau of Indian Affairs of the 
United States Department of the Interior (“BIA”) certified that B.N. is one-
fourth Sioux,13 and thereby meets the minimum required degree of “Oceti 
Sakowin” Indian blood for enrollment in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.14 
“The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe has enrolled B.N. as a member of the 
Tribe,”15 and “[t]here is no dispute that B.N. is a member of the Standing 
Rock Sioux Tribe, a federally recognized ‘Indian tribe’ within the meaning of 
the ICWA.”16 
Unfortunately, both mother and father struggled with drug and alcohol 
abuse and were often in trouble with the law.17 The pair was convicted of 
numerous crimes before the Fairfax County Department of Family Services 
(“Family Services”) decided to intervene.18 Family Services “initiated a variety 
of steps designed to protect B.N.: a preliminary protective order, a foster care 
placement on April 11, 2011, and ultimately, a petition to terminate the 
parental rights of both parents.”19 The Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
                                                                                                                                      
 8. Id. at 374-76. 
 9. Id. at 356. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. CONSTITUTION OF THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE Apr. 24, 1959, 
http://www.nd.gov/indianaffairs/image/cache/Standing_Rock_Constitution.pdf 
 15. Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 356. 
 16. Id. at 363; see Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 77 Fed. Reg. 47868-01, 47871 (Aug. 10, 2012) (listing the Standing 
Rock Sioux Tribe of North and South Dakota as a federally recognized tribe). 
 17. Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 356. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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District Court of Fairfax County terminated Vanderplas’s and Nguyen’s 
residual parental rights on May 3, 2012.20  
Since being removed from the custody of her biological parents, B.N. has 
resided with her foster parents, Tyrus and Ja’Ree Thompson.21 The 
Thompsons wish to adopt B.N.,22 who suffers from Reactive Attachment 
Disorder (RAD).23 This disorder is codified as 313.89 in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. RAD is diagnosed through anecdotal 
evidence of “disturbed and developmentally inappropriate social relatedness 
in most contexts that begins before age 5 . . . .”24 RAD “is associated with 
grossly pathological care that may take the form of . . . repeated changes of 
primary caregiver that prevent formation of stable attachments (e.g., frequent 
changes in foster care).”25 
B. Procedural History 
Throughout implementation of the Family Services plan to protect B.N., 
Family Services attempted to keep the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (“the 
Tribe”) informed of the status of B.N.’s case. On April 15, 2011, the Tribe 
participated in the foster care placement hearing via telephone.26 On May 2, 
2011, the Tribe was notified of their right to intervene in the foster care 
proceedings, as per the ICWA, in a letter addressed to Terrance Yellow Fat, 
representative of the Tribe.27 On May 10, 2011, the County mailed a copy of 
the adjudicatory order to Mr. Yellow Fat, informing him that a dispositional 
hearing on behalf of B.N. would take place on June 10, 2011.28 Over the next 
year, Family Services continued attempts to notify the tribe by registered 
mail, via Mr. Yellow Fat, of various adjudicatory hearings, dispositional 
hearings, and hearings on the Family Service’s petitions for permanency 
planning. On April 4, 2012, Family Services “attempted to contact Mr. Yellow 
Fat by telephone and by sending him a letter by certified mail . . . informing 
him of the upcoming court hearing scheduled for May 3, 2012, in Juvenile 
                                                                                                                                      
 20. Id. at 356-357. 
 21. Id. at 356. 
 22. Id. at 359. 
 23. Id. at 359. 
 24. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
116 (4th ed. 1994). 
 25. Id.   
 26. Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 357. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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and Domestic Relations court.”29 On June 19, 2012, Family Services mailed 
yet another certified letter to Mr. Yellow Fat informing the Tribe that the  
hearing for the termination of parental rights was scheduled for August 6, 
2012, in the Fairfax County Circuit Court, and that the Tribe had the right to 
intervene in the proceedings.30  
The Tribe failed to intervene until August 1, 2012, when a motion to 
intervene was filed in Juvenile and Domestic Relations court.31 At the time, 
however, the case was already pending in circuit court.32 Because of this 
confusion, the “circuit court granted the parties’ motion to continue the trial 
date from August 6, 2012, to September 11, 2012, and again to September 12, 
2012.”33 On September 7, 2012, the Tribe filed a motion to intervene in the 
circuit court, where the case was currently being tried,34 and the court granted 
the motion that same day.35 On September 10, 2012, the Tribe, relying on the 
ICWA, moved to transfer jurisdiction of the case to the tribal court.36 B.N.’s 
biological parents, Vanderplas and Nguyen, were in favor of the Tribe’s 
motion to transfer the case.37  
Opposing this motion, Family Services, B.N.’s putative adoptive parents, 
the Thompsons, and B.N.’s guardian ad litem, Nancy J. Martin, Esq., argued 
that transfer of the case at such a late date would be inappropriate for three 
reasons: first, the placement proceedings were at an advanced stage, and the 
tribe had failed to promptly petition for transfer of jurisdiction prior to 
adjudication, despite adequate notification per the IWCA; second, the 
evidence necessary to decide the case could not be presented adequately in 
the tribal court without undue hardship to Family Services, as well as the 
witnesses involved in the case, because Standing Rock Sioux Tribal courts are 
located in North Dakota, more than 1600 miles from Fairfax County; and 
finally, transfer of the case would cause immediate harm to B.N., given her 
diagnosis of RAD.38 Additionally Ms. Martin, B.N.’s guardian ad litem, 
argued the EIF exception precludes application of the ICWA on these facts, 
                                                                                                                                      
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 357-58. 
 34. Id. at 358. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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and thus the application of the ICWA in this case would be 
unconstitutional.39 
The circuit court rejected these arguments, and urged a finding of good 
cause to deny transfer. As to the Family Service’s first argument, the court 
held that “the proceedings were not at an advanced stage because the Tribe 
presented its motion to transfer before the trial de novo on the termination 
of parental rights.” 40 Furthermore, the parents had not been notified of their 
independent right to request transfer and were prejudiced by this lack of 
notice.41 As to the second argument, the court held that modern 
technologies—such as video conferencing—could mitigate any 
inconvenience posed to Family Services or their witnesses by trying the case 
in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal courts in North Dakota.42 The counsel for 
the Tribe noted further that such practice has become “commonplace” in 
many workplaces, and that such technology has provided an adequate means 
of communication in similar cases.43 As to the third argument, the court held 
that the best interests of the child was an inappropriate standard to use in 
determining whether to transfer the case to a tribal court.44 As to the guardian 
ad litem’s arguments, the court held that the statute was constitutional, both 
on its face and as applied.45 
The guardian ad litem filed an emergency motion to stay the court’s order 
pending appeal and joined B.N.’s foster parents’ motion to reconsider the 
trial court’s transfer.46 The foster parents contended further that because 
B.N.’s biological father was not a member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 
the tribal court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the termination of his 
parental rights.47 As such, “Fairfax County Circuit Court was the only court 
with jurisdiction over both parents.”48 Therefore, the court had good cause to 
refuse transfer.49 The circuit court denied the motion to reconsider, and 
instead granted the motion to stay the order to transfer pending appeal. 
                                                                                                                                      
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 358-59. 
 46. Id. at 359. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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C. A Brief History of ICWA 
The ICWA was enacted on November 8, 1978.50 The Act governs which 
court has jurisdiction over custody disputes involving Indian children. It 
provides that tribes “shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any 
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is 
domiciled within the reservation of such tribe . . . .”51 Once exclusive 
jurisdiction is established, the tribe retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction 
over the case, regardless of where the child is physically located. However, 
when custody proceedings involve an Indian child who resides or is 
domiciled outside of tribal lands, the tribe must share jurisdiction with the 
state in which the child resides or is domiciled.52 Further, the ICWA provides 
for certain placement preferences when Indian children are placed for 
adoption.53 It allows the child’s tribe to intervene in custody proceedings and 
remove the case to tribal court for adjudication within the tribal system.54 
The purpose of the ICWA is to protect Indian children, preserve and 
strengthen Indian families, ensure placement permanency for Indian 
children, protect the continuing existence of Indian cultures, and ensure that 
tribes can exercise their sovereign authority over child custody proceedings.55 
It is through the preservation and maintenance of a relationship with family, 
elders, tribal community, and culture that the Indian child’s sense of 
permanence and identity is protected.56 The ICWA recognizes the vulnerable 
nature of Native American tribes, and their need for protection. Native tribes 
stand in a unique relationship to the United States government; they possess 
special rights that must be recognized and protected in sensitive litigation, 
such as child placement proceedings.57 As a part of the ICWA’s initial 
                                                                                                                                      
 50. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978). 
 51. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a). 
 52. 25 U.S.C. §1911(b); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 60-61 
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Section 1911(b), providing for the exercise of concurrent 
jurisdiction by state and tribal courts when the Indian child is not domiciled on the 
reservation, gives the Indian parents a veto to prevent the transfer of a state-court action to 
tribal court. ‘By allowing the Indian parents to ’choose’ the forum that will decide whether to 
sever the parent-child relationship, Congress promotes the security of Indian families by 
allowing the Indian parents to defend in the court system that most reflects the parents’ 
familial standards.’” (quoting Jones, Indian Child Welfare: A Jurisdictional Approach, 21 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1123, 1141 (1979)). 
 53. 25 U.S.C. § 1915. 
 54. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c); 25 U.S.C. § 1918. 
 55. 25 U.S.C. § 1901. 
 56. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1902. 
 57. Id. 
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findings, Congress noted that, “[T]here is no resource that is more vital to 
the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children . . . 
.”58 Tribes rely on their children to continue the culture of the tribe. By taking 
children away from their Native homes, or placing them in homes in which 
contact with their Native tribe was rendered ostensibly impracticable, the 
United States government was slowly destroying Native culture. 
“The ‘wholesale separation of Indian children from their families’ was 
widely viewed as the ‘most tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian 
life.’”59 While this separation began as early as the 1800s when the 
government began attempts to assimilate Native Americans by forcing 
American Indian children into boarding schools, it reached its climax during 
the 1970s, immediately before the ratification of the ICWA.60 The ICWA 
“was the product of rising concern in the mid-1970s over the consequences 
to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare 
practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children 
from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care 
placement . . . .”61 Congress faced mounting pressure from states with large 
Native American populations, where approximately twenty-five to thirty-five 
percent of Native American children had been removed from their Native 
homes.62 According to a 1969 study that examined the racial demographics 
of foster care placements of Native American children across sixteen states, 
approximately eighty-five percent of the children who had been removed 
from their homes were placed in non-native foster homes.63 In South Dakota, 
Native American children were sixteen times more likely than their non-
native peers to be placed in foster care.64 Adoption of Native American 
children in Washington State was nineteen times the national average.65  
Often, these children were removed from their Native homes by non-
native judges and social workers who lacked a thorough understanding of 
Native American child rearing practices.66  For example, parental rights of 
                                                                                                                                      
 58. Id.  
 59. Cheyanna L. Jaffke, The “Existing Indian Family” Exception to the Indian Child 
Welfare Act: The States’ Attempt to Slaughter Tribal Interests in Indian Children, 66 LA. L. REV. 
733, 735 (2006) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978)).  
 60. Id. at 734-35. 
 61. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989). 
 62. B.J. JONES ET AL., THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE 
CUSTODY AND ADOPTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN CHILDREN 2 (2d ed. 2008). 
 63. Id. at 4. 
 64. Id. at 2. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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Native parents were terminated routinely for alleged neglect and emotional 
abuse. The grounds for these claims were that the custodial parent left the 
child with a non-nuclear family member for an extended period of time.67 
While the practice of leaving one’s child in the care of an extended family 
member for a protracted period of time is contrary to Anglo-Saxon 
traditions, it is commonplace in Native American communities. In fact, it is 
expected that the extended tribal family will raise the child.68   
This common occurrence has shaped the narrative of many young Indian 
lives. Larry Ahenakew of the Ahtahkakoop Cree, for instance, was removed 
from his maternal grandmother’s custody when he was three and a half years 
old.69 As per the Native American concept of family, those with whom a child 
could be reared “included not only those in the nuclear family but also those 
related by marriage or by some other traditional bond.”70 Other traditional 
bonds included extended family members, such as aunts, uncles, 
grandmothers, and grandfathers. As per Cree tradition, it was expected that, 
because Larry was the eldest male child, his maternal grandmother would 
raise him.71  
However, Montana Child Protective services disagreed with Cree 
tradition, and determined that Larry’s grandmother was an unfit caregiver.72 
For years, Larry was disconnected from his tribal community and identity. 
At the age of thirty-one, Larry was able to reunite with his family.73 Although 
he had learned both Cree and English as a child and had a good 
understanding of both languages when he was removed from his 
grandmother’s care, Larry was unable to speak Cree with his grandmother 
upon their reunion.74 In order to remedy the issues presented in cases like 
Larry’s, and protect the unique standing of Native American tribes in relation 
to the United States government, Congress passed a series of acts in the 1970s 
to facilitate Native American self-determination, of which the ICWA was a 
large part.   
                                                                                                                                      
 67. Id. at 3. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Lizbeth González, The Real Meaning of ICWA Noncompliance, 86-APR N.Y. ST. B.J. 
29 (2014).  
 70. JONES ET AL., supra note 62, at 3. 
 71. González, supra note 69, at 29. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 30. 
 74. Id. 
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D. Judicially Created Exceptions 
1. Constitutionality of the ICWA 
While implementation of the ICWA has served to ameliorate some of the 
evils caused by cultural insensitivity and lack of oversight with respect to 
Native custody hearings, many have questioned the constitutionality of the 
Act. It has been characterized as a usurpation of states’ rights in state juvenile 
proceedings and social service agencies.75 The ICWA derives its jurisdictional 
authority from the Commerce Clause, which provides that “‘Congress shall 
have Power. . . To regulate commerce. . . with Indian tribes . . . and, through 
this and other constitutional authority, Congress has plenary power over 
Indian affairs.”76 Historically, most effective attacks on the ICWA’s 
constitutionality—and in fact, the only ones to have any influence on the 
courts—have come in the form of equal protection claims.77 
2.  The “Existing Family Exception” 
The “Existing Family Exception” is a judicially created doctrine that 
originated in Kansas in the 1980s.78 This exception precludes the courts from 
applying the ICWA to cases where the child in question has not been 
removed from a traditionally Native home. Thus, if the “child’s parents have 
not maintained . . . significant social, cultural, or political” affiliations with 
their tribe of origin, the court can decide unilaterally that the child’s custody 
determination is not protected by the provisions of the ICWA.79 While some 
have argued that this exception is necessary to maintain the constitutionality 
of the ICWA, others have viewed it as “a back-door approach to do exactly 
what the ICWA was intended to prevent: imposition of white middle class 
standards to child custody cases involving American Indian children.”80 
As previously noted, the EIF exception was first proposed by the Supreme 
Court of Kansas in the 1982 case In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.81 Allegedly, 
the exception was necessary to preserve the constitutionality of the ICWA.82  
                                                                                                                                      
 75. JONES ET AL., supra note 62, at 1.  
 76. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2015) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
 77. See In re Santos Y., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1274, 1305 (2001); Guardianship of Zachary H., 
73 Cal. App. 4th 51 (1999); Crystal R. v. Super. Ct., 59 Cal. App. 4th 703 (1997); In re 
Alexandria Y., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (1996); In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (1996). 
 78. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982). 
 79. Jaffke, supra note 59, at 741-42.  
 80. Id. at 741.  
 81. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982). 
 82. Jaffke, supra note 59, at 743. 
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A line of California cases have held that any application of ICWA, based 
solely upon the child’s race, rather than “substantial social, cultural, or 
political affiliations” turns the ICWA into a race-based statute.83  As such, 
California courts contend, it must withstand strict scrutiny in order to satisfy 
the guarantee of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.84 This 
argument, discussed in further detail below, is flawed in that the essential 
element of the ICWA is that it is not triggered by the race of the child in 
question, but rather, the child’s citizenship.85 In order for the ICWA to apply, 
the child must either be a member of a federally recognized tribe, or eligible 
for tribal membership.86   
In Baby Boy L., a non-native mother sought termination of a Native 
American father’s parental rights.87 Baby Boy L. was born to an unwed non-
Indian mother and an Indian father.88 The non-native mother consented to 
the adoption of Baby Boy L. by non-native adoptive parents.89 The biological 
father, a five-eighths Kiowa Indian, his paternal grandparents, and the Kiowa 
Indian tribe of which the biological father was an enrolled member, sought 
review of the judgment of the Sedgwick County District Court.90 The court 
entered a decree of adoption of Baby Boy L. in favor of the non-native 
adoptive parents, and denied the tribe’s motion to intervene in the adoption 
proceedings.91 On appeal, the Kiowa Tribe claimed that § 1901 of the ICWA 
applied to the adoption proceedings and that the tribe had a right to 
intervene.92 The Kansas Supreme Court held that the trial court was right to 
determine that the plain text of the ICWA did not apply to Baby Boy L., as he 
was only five-sixteenths Indian.93 Further, he had never been removed from 
an existing Indian family.94 The court additionally held that any error that 
                                                                                                                                      
 83. See In re Santos Y., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1274, 1305 (2001); Guardianship of Zachary H., 
73 Cal. App. 4th 51 (1999); Crystal R. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 4th 703 (1997); In re 
Alexandria Y., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (1996); In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1509 
(1996). 
 84. Jaffke, supra note 59, at 743. 
 85. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2015). 
 86. Id. 
 87. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 173 (Kan. 1982). 
 88. Id. at 172. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 172.  
 91. Id. at 188. 
 92. Id. at 172.  
 93. Id. at 175. 
 94. Id. 
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could have occurred by refusing the Indian tribe’s petition to intervene was 
harmless, and there was overwhelming evidence that the Indian father was 
unfit to assume his parental duties.95 For this latter reason, and because the 
biological father had failed to support Baby Boy L. for the two years prior to 
the termination of his parental rights, the court held that the father’s consent 
to the adoption of his illegitimate baby was not required.96 The court affirmed 
the judgment of the trial court, which entered a decree of adoption of the 
baby in favor of the adoptive parents and denied the Indian tribe’s motion to 
intervene.97 
The court held that the Act was intended only to apply to situations where 
a child was being removed from an existing Indian family unit.98 In the years 
following the decision in Baby Boy L., approximately half of the states 
adopted the EIF exception, even though this exception is absent from the 
actual text of the ICWA.99 Since its inception, the EIF exception has come 
under harsh criticism. The exception essentially requires courts to assess the 
“Indianness” of a particular Indian child, parent, or family, a subjective 
determination that courts “are ill-equipped to make.”100 Most states have 
abandoned this judicially created exception. However, some states—
including: Alabama,101 California,102 Indiana,103 Kentucky,104 Louisiana,105 
Missouri,106 and Tennessee107—still apply the EIF exception. Alabama and 
Indiana have limited the doctrine so that it only applies under certain rare 
and extenuating circumstances.108 
In Thompson, both the foster parents and the guardian ad litem relied on 
persuasive case law from California, which holds that a failure to recognize 
                                                                                                                                      
 95. Id. at 180. 
 96. Id. at 188.  
 97. Id. at 188. 
 98. Id. at 175.  
 99. Dan Lewerenz & Padraic McCoy, The End of “Existing Indian Family” Jurisprudence: 
Holyfield at 20, In the Matter of A.J.S., and the Last Gasps of a Dying Doctrine, 36 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 684, 687 n.10 (2010). 
 100. Thompson v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 62 Va. App. 350, 368 (2013) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 101. S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990). 
 102. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (1996). 
 103. In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E. 2d 298 (Ind. 1988). 
 104. Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996). 
 105. Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
 106. C.E.H. v. R.H., 837 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
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the EIF exception raises doubts as to the constitutionality of the ICWA.109 
They argued that statutes should be construed so as to avoid such doubts.110 
California has invoked the EIF exception on numerous occasions, and “in 
each case the effect of applying the [EIF exception] was to deny a tribe 
jurisdiction or the right to intervene.”111 California courts have cited two 
primary arguments for the necessity of applying the EIF exception: (1) 
without the exception, the ICWA violates the equal protection clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution,112 and (2) 
application of the ICWA to familial situations where strong cultural ties do 
not already exist violates the purpose of the ICWA.113 
The appellant’s argument in the 1996 California Court of Appeals case of 
In re Bridget R.114 is a prime example of this type of constitutional argument. 
In In Re Bridget, the court held under the Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments that:   
[T]he ICWA does not and cannot apply to invalidate a voluntary 
termination of parental rights respecting an American Indian 
child who is not domiciled on a reservation, unless the child’s 
biological parent, or parents, are not only of American Indian 
descent, but also maintain a significant social, cultural, or political 
relationship with their tribe.115  
In re Bridget R. and similar cases have found that there is no equal protection 
violation when custody determinations are based on Native Americans’ 
social, cultural, or political relationships with their tribes.116 “However, when 
such social, cultural, or political relationships do not exist or are very 
attenuated, they find the only remaining basis for applying the ICWA is the 
child’s race.”117 Arriving at its determination by viewing the ICWA as a race-
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based statute, the In re Bridget R. court applied strict scrutiny as the 
appropriate standard of review.118  
This is a misinterpretation of the ICWA. Rather than being a race-based 
statute, eligibility for ICWA protection is predicated on whether the child in 
question is a member of a federally recognized tribe, or is eligible to apply for 
membership in such a tribe.119 Each sovereign tribe decides it’s own 
qualifications for tribal membership. Requirements for tribal citizenship are 
separate and district from the requirements one must meet in order to be 
eligible for benefits and services through the BIA. Citizenship, not race, is the 
determining factor that triggers application of the ICWA. Given the 
increased rate of biracial and multiracial births within the past decade,120 it is 
not unfeasible that there could be an instance where a child may meet the 
federal standards to qualify as Indian, but lack the requisite qualifications to 
be eligible for tribal membership.121 In this instance, the child would be 
eligible for benefits through the BIA but ineligible for ICWA protections. In 
this way, a child’s rights under the ICWA are more analogous to those of a 
non-citizen than they are akin to historically persecuted minority groups.122 
As such, strict scrutiny is an inappropriate basis of review. 
Another reason cited by the California courts for applying the EIF 
exception is that they believe the purpose of the ICWA is to maintain 
American Indian culture. If however, there is no culture to maintain, then 
there is no need to apply the ICWA. As the California Court of Appeals stated 
in In re Bridget, “It is almost too obvious to require articulation that ‘the 
unique values of Indian culture’ will not be preserved in the homes of parents 
who have become fully assimilated into non-Indian culture.”123 The 
determination of who is fully assimilated into non-Indian culture is then left 
to the court itself. California is not alone in this approach.  Several other states 
have refused to apply the ICWA unless an American Indian child is being 
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removed from an existing Indian family.124 These states misinterpret the 
purpose of the ICWA by limiting it to the protection of American Indian 
children from improper removal from their existing Indian family units to 
promote the stability and security of American Indian tribes. 
Most recently, the Supreme Court of the United States considered the 
issue of the constitutionality of the EIF exception to the ICWA in the case of 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.125 In this case, Dusten and Robin Brown sought 
to adopt four-year-old baby Veronica.126 “The Browns based their adoption 
petitions on the Indian preference provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act 
. . . and the assumption that the Baby Girl Court did not affirm the EIF 
exception doctrine . . . .”127 Baby Veronica was born to a non-native mother 
and a Native father.128 The baby was a member of the Cherokee Nation.129 
When Baby Veronica’s biological mother and father ended their relationship, 
the father relinquished his parental rights,130 and Baby Veronica’s birth 
mother placed her for adoption.131 The Browns commenced adoption 
proceedings, at which time the biological father sought custody of Baby 
Veronica.132 The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a decision granting 
the father custody under §§ 1901-1963 of the ICWA.133 The U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to review the case.134 
At no time, either prior to Baby Veronica’s birth or subsequently, did her 
biological father provide any financial support for the child,135 nor did he ever 
have custody of the girl.136 The Browns provided financial support during the 
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biological mother’s pregnancy and had custody of the child prior to the state 
court’s ruling.137 The Supreme Court held that, “The phrase ‘continued 
custody’ therefore refers to custody that a parent already has (or at least had 
at some point in the past). As a result, § 1912(f) does not apply in cases where 
the Indian parent never had custody of the Indian child.”138 The court held 
that this interpretation was consistent with both the plain text of the statute 
and the purpose: to counteract the unwarranted removal of Indian 
children.139 “[W]hen . . . the adoption of an Indian child is voluntarily and 
lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent with sole custodial rights, the 
ICWA’s primary goal of preventing the unwarranted removal of Indian 
children and the dissolution of Indian families is not implicated.”140 The 
court found that § 1912(d), which addresses remedial services and 
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian 
family,141 applied only where the breakup of an Indian family occurs as a 
result of the termination of the parent’s rights.142 When, as in this case, a 
Native parent abandoned his child prior to birth and never had custody, there 
was no relationship in existence, nor any existing family to break up.143 The 
ICWA’s adoption preferences under § 1915(a) were not implicated in this 
case because the father had not sought custody of Baby Veronica.144 Rather, 
he was arguing that his parental rights were terminated wrongfully.145 
Marcia Zug, Associate Professor of Law at the University of South 
Carolina School of Law, recently wrote an article concerning the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.146  She argues that the 
Court’s ruling ought to be  limited to ICWA § 1912(d) and (f).  As such, Baby 
Girl should not be taken as a confirmation or endorsement of the EIF 
exception.  Nonetheless, she extrapolates that it will potentially “curtail the 
applicability of the placement preferences in many future ICWA cases.”147   
Clearly, the way in which courts will interpret and apply the EIF exception 
to the ICWA is, at best, unclear. What is clear is that courts, such as the 
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Kansas Supreme Court in Baby Boy L., have historically used the EIF 
exception to prevent application of the ICWA.  Thus, many tribes have been 
denied the protections supposedly guaranteed to them by the ICWA, as it 
was never applied. Rather than judicially enshrining a practice that has led to 
such abuse, courts ought to declare the EIF exception unnecessary, as 
Virginia did in Thompson, and allow ICWA protections to safeguard tribal 
interests as Congress originally intended. 
E. Determination of Good Cause 
Ensuring that ICWA protections are not obviated by judicially created 
doctrines like the EIF exception is only one piece of the puzzle.  Even when 
courts have not outright refused to apply the ICWA, courts will still try to 
hold on to jurisdiction over the proceedings by loosely interpreting the 
appropriate standard for removal.  25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) states that “[i]n any 
State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of 
parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the 
reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause 
to the contrary.”148 However, that which constitutes “good cause” is never 
adequately defined.  In the absence of a definition within the statute, the 
courts have endeavored to determine what constitutes “good cause.” 
1.  Best Interests of the Child 
Many courts have adopted a test that weighs various factors in 
consideration of the best interests of the child in determination of whether 
good cause exists to deny a transfer of a case to tribal court. 149 In fact, a best 
interest standard is the standard currently championed by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs guidelines.  Still, other courts have rejected this type of analysis 
as irrelevant.150 The Thompson opinion articulates the rationale underlying 
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the approach taken by the courts that do not apply the best interest factors. “[B]y 
providing tribal courts with presumptive jurisdiction, Congress presumed that 
[the tribal courts, rather that the state] courts would consider a child’s best 
interests in adjudicating a termination of parental rights case.”151  
In Virginia, there are ten factors that the court considers in determining 
the best interests of the child. These are: (1) the age and physical and mental 
condition of the child, giving due consideration to the child’s changing 
developmental needs; (2) the age and physical and mental condition of each 
parent; (3) the relationship that exists between each parent and each child, 
giving due consideration to the positive involvement in the child’s life, the 
ability to accurately assess and meet the emotional, intellectual and physical 
needs of the child; (4) the needs of the child, giving due consideration to other 
important relationships of the child, including, but not limited to, siblings, 
peers and extended family members; (5) the role that each parent has played 
and will play in the future, in the upbringing and care of the child; (6) the 
propensity of each parent to support the child’s contact and relationship with 
the other parent actively, including whether a parent has unreasonably 
denied the other parent access to or visitation with the child; (7) the relative 
willingness and demonstrated ability of each parent to maintain a close and 
continuing relationship with the child, and the ability of each parent to 
cooperate in and resolve disputes regarding matters affecting the child; (8) 
the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of 
reasonable intelligence, understanding, age and experience to express such a 
preference; (9) any history of family abuse or sexual abuse; and (10) any other 
factors that the court deems necessary and proper to the determination.152 
After reaching a decision based on the merits of these factors, a judge shall 
communicate, either orally or in writing, his findings regarding factors 
relevant to his/her custody decision.153  
2.  Proposed Solution: Immediate Harm 
As a solution to the quandary posed by the jurisdictional split on the 
application of the analysis of the best interests of the child, the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia proposed the application of a new standard. They 
“conclude[d] that the appropriate test is whether the transfer of jurisdiction 
itself would cause, or would present a substantial risk of causing immediate, 
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”154 
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III. ANALYSIS 
In order to appreciate fully the ramifications of the court’s decision in 
Thompson, it is necessary to evaluate the rights of the interested parties. “In 
cases involving children there is often no obvious ‘bad guy.’”155 Excluding 
sporadic cases involving malice, each party to a custody dispute simply seeks 
a placement that is in the best interests of the child. Conflicts arise when the 
parties disagree as to what those best interests are. In order to weigh and 
balance the competing interests, it is important to first examine the concept 
of best interests. 
A. Interests of the Parties Involved 
1.  Child’s Interests 
Native children pose a unique challenge in placement, as they have unique 
best interests. In these cases, the court cannot merely take into consideration 
the best interests of that individual child, but also must consider what is in 
the best interests of continuing that child’s cultural legacy. This is a lofty task 
for any court. For this reason, the ICWA sets a standard that is sufficiently 
malleable to adapt to the individual circumstances of the case, while 
maintaining certain presumptive preferences and preserving the right of the 
Tribe to intervene.  
“[A] parent’s right to the preservation of his relationship with his child 
derives from the fact that the parent’s achievement of a rich and rewarding 
life is likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing 
of his offspring.”156 Correspondingly, a child’s right to protection of the 
relationship he shares with either or both parents “derives from the psychic 
importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsive, reliable adult.”157 
This language speaks to the right of each and every child, regardless of race 
or citizenship, to remain connected to that from which he or she came; a right 
to remain in contact with their culture or their “roots.” This notion is 
embodied in the practice of placing children preferentially with family 
members before seeking to place them within the foster system. The ICWA 
takes this notion a step further to require that Native children presumptively 
be placed in Native homes.158 In this way, these children are able to remain in 
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touch with their cultural “roots” and ensure the continuation of Native 
culture for future generations of their own progeny. 
The right to a sense of belonging is an internationally recognized right for 
children.159 The United Nations “Convention on the Rights of the Child” 
provides for such rights, such as the right of the child to “preserve his or her 
identity, including nationality, name, and family relations, as recognized by 
law, without lawful interference.”160  Further, when the child’s right to 
preserve his or her identity is interfered with or “[w]here a child is illegally 
deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States’ parties 
shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to 
reestablishing speedily his or her identity.”161  Under the convention, children 
maintain a recognized right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion,162 as well as the right to freedom of association and peaceful 
assembly.163 The U.S. is not currently a signatory to this convention.164 
However, international public opinion seems to want standards set by an 
international governing body, like the United Nations, as de facto 
minimums, even though they may not be de jure.165 
2.  Parents’ Interests 
Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children.166 Virginia courts 
have historically held that, “[n]o bond is so precious and none should be 
more zealously protected by the law as the bond between parent and child.”167 
“A parent’s right to the custody of his or her children is an element of ‘liberty’ 
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States.”168 Only when the state shows that a parent is unfit to 
adequately care for the needs of his or her child may the state intervene in the 
parent/child relationship.169 These protections are “not confined to the 
protection of citizens[,] . . . [t]hese provisions are universal in their 
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard 
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to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.”170 The state may only 
interfere with parental rights, of either a citizen or noncitizen, if there is 
evidence that a parent is unfit to care for the needs of the child.171 
In Thompson, the state was able to show that both the biological mother 
and father were unfit to the task of parenthood,172 and because of their 
individual frailties, they were unable to care for the daily needs of their 
child.173 However, their participation in the case is evidence that the 
termination of their parental rights did not eliminate their interest in their 
child’s wellbeing. Given the circumstances, it is noteworthy that the court 
allowed the disenfranchised parents to continue to participate in the 
proceedings, as well as noting the parents’ preferences throughout the 
opinion.174 The court in Thompson made specific mention of B.N.’s parents’ 
support of the motion to transfer the case to tribal court.175 While B.N.’s 
parents had lost their right to any legal claim over her, the court recognized 
their wishes, as though it were recognizing the important role this connection 
to her parents’ wishes would play in her life. 
3.  Tribal Interests 
“Tribal Nations are possessed with inherent sovereignty . . . [and] 
relationships between a Tribal Nation and its members are within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Nation.”176 Native American Tribal 
Nations stand in a unique political relationship to the United States of 
America.177 Tribal nations are sovereign entities that possess exclusive 
jurisdiction over tribal matters.178 This legal status grants Native American 
children unique legal status as well, which, in turn, must be observed during 
child custody disputes wherein the ICWA grants the Tribe exclusive 
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jurisdiction. Though some have challenged the constitutionality of the ICWA 
on the grounds of equal protection, this unique legal status is not due to any 
consideration of the child’s race. Rather, an Indian child enjoys certain rights 
and privileges by virtue of his or her citizenship or membership of a sovereign 
nation or tribe.179 These rights include, but are not limited to: those provided 
for by federal law, state statute, or Indian treaty; certain educational benefits 
offered by the BIA and various other organizations; various healthcare 
benefits offered by the BIA and other organizations; international border 
crossing rights; the right to own and inherit reservation property; a right to 
participate in Tribal Governance; entitlement payments from their tribal 
government, and, finally, a right to a sense of belonging.180 As such, the “best 
interests of an Indian child” are inherently different from the “best interests 
of a child” standard. 
4.  States’ Interests 
As parens patriae, the state has an interest in the health, safety, and welfare 
of children.181 Prince v. Massachusetts established that the society’s interest in 
protecting children is a compelling state interest182 that may trump a parent’s 
right to the custody of his or her children when the child’s safety and well-
being are at risk.183 The State has a duty to protect that child and, if necessary, 
intrude on the parents’ right to raise the child by both retaining custody and 
directing the child’s religious and moral upbringing. 
B. Effect of a Judicially Created Exception 
1.  Existing Indian Family Exception 
In her 1997 testimony before the Joint Hearing of the House Resources 
Committee and the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Assistant Secretary 
of the Interior, Ada Deer, of the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin 
stated: 
[W]e want to express our grave concern that the objectives of the 
ICWA continue to be frustrated by State court created judicial 
exceptions to the ICWA. We are concerned that State court judges 
who have created the “existing Indian family” exception are 
delving into the sensitive and complicated areas of Indian cultural 
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values, customs, and practices[,] which under existing law have 
been left exclusively to the judgment of Indian tribes. . . . We 
oppose any legislative recognition of the concept.184 
The EIF exception to the ICWA is a prime example of a state court reading 
public bias into the law. It obviates the law by allowing the court to make its 
own individual determination of the “Indian-ness” of the child in question. 
Further, it uses racial stereotypes to meet these objectives. For example, one 
test used by courts to evaluate whether the child had previously been part of 
an existing Indian family includes determining whether the child had 
previously lived “in an ‘actual Indian dwelling,’ apparently thinking of a 
teepee, hogan, or pueblo.”185 
2.  Application of the best interests of the child standard 
The ICWA itself uses “best interest” language.186 However, it would be a 
mistake to assume that application of traditional best interest factors is what 
the legislation intended. “It is likely that most attorneys simply consider 
Indian child merely as a racial factor in the standard. This response, however, 
fails to recognize that a best interest of an Indian child standard is inherently 
different from [the state’s] best interest of a child standard.”187 The “best 
interests of the child” are not coterminous with the “best interests of the 
Indian child.” Rather, the language must be read in the context of the ICWA 
as a whole. The statutory language links the best interests of the Indian child 
with the best interests of the Indian parent.188 In turn, these interests are 
linked with the best interests of the tribal community as a whole.189 “ICWA 
is not the only place to find the phrases ‘best interest’ and ‘Indian child,’ 
however. In fact, it has been at the state level that some of the most 
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noteworthy efforts at joining these terms into a ‘best interest of an Indian 
child’ standard can be found.”190  
C. Potential Effects of Applying an Immediate Harm Standard 
1.  Advantages 
There seem to be more advantages than drawbacks to the application of 
this standard. First, it appropriately respects tribal interests. Narrowly 
defining “good cause” as that which would not cause immediate harm to the 
child is more consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting the ICWA, thus 
ensuring Indian children are not capriciously ripped away from their culture 
in a short sighted attempt at assimilation. The immediate harm standard 
preserves the right of Tribes to intervene and limits the degree to which 
courts can interfere with this right. It demonstrates a proper respect for and 
deference to tribal courts. Tribal courts are composed of tribe members. 
These individuals, the ones most familiar with the culture and its 
importance—not only the child, but the tribe as a whole—are the ones best 
situated to determine the best interests of the Indian child. The court in 
Thompson writes that Congress presumed that “in the event of a transfer, 
tribal courts are fully competent to consider the child’s best interests in 
adjudicating the termination of parental rights proceeding.”191  
Second, it adequately takes into consideration the rights and interests of 
the child. An immediate harm standard retains a certain degree of latitude in 
its application. It is a malleable enough standard to anticipate that there may 
be some instances in which removal would harm the child. For instance, as 
the putative adoptive parents contended in Thompson, removing the case to 
tribal court may have a profound effect on a child with pronounced 
attachment issues.192 In these instances, the immediate harm standard 
provides an escape mechanism. 
2.  Drawbacks 
Although applying an “immediate harm” standard is a more appropriate 
standard than that of the “best interest of the child” for the reasons 
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aforementioned, it nonetheless imposes judicial reasoning on the statute. 
Section 1911(b) is vague with respect to what constitutes “good cause” to 
deny transfer. As with any new standard, there may be unforeseen 
disadvantages in defining “good cause” with an immediate harm standard. It 
may take time before any potential unforeseen harm becomes known. In the 
meantime, other courts may be slow to adopt Virginia’s standard. 
IV.  A CALL FOR CHANGE 
The ICWA, as applied, fails to meet its intended purpose. Native American 
advocates claim that the ICWA hurts those it was intended to protect.193 They 
are angry that “[f]ederal tax dollars are being used across the country to 
support the enactment and adherence to this law; however in thousands of 
cases, the law is destroying loving, stable families and placing children in 
harmful and difficult situations.”194  
Due to alleged abuses of judicial discretion, there has been a recent 
movement for increased federal oversight over the implementation of, and 
compliance with, ICWA. In early 2014, several Native American advocacy 
organizations, including the National Congress of American Indians, the 
Native American Rights Fund, the National Indian Child Welfare 
Association, and the Association on American Indian Affairs sent a letter to 
the Department of Justice urging them to investigate ICWA violations 
nationwide.195 In December 2014, President Obama hosted the White House 
Tribal Nations Conference in Washington, D.C.196 The conference provided 
leaders from the 566 federally recognized tribes a forum in which to discuss 
pertinent issues with U.S. leaders, including the President and members of 
the White House Council on Native American Affairs.197  
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V.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
At the conclusion of the Conference, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder 
briefly outlined the administration’s plan to enhance compliance with the 
ICWA. This included an unprecedented announcement that the Department 
of Justice will begin to intervene by filing amicus briefs in state court cases 
involving Native American children in order to make sure that state agencies 
comply with the act. Holder announced, “We are working to actively identify 
state-court cases where the United States can file briefs opposing the 
unnecessary and illegal removal of Indian children from their families and 
their tribal communities.”198 The administration would be “redoubling” its 
efforts to support the ICWA, in order to “protect Indian children from being 
illegally removed from their families; to prevent the further destruction of 
Native traditions through forced and unnecessary assimilation; and to 
preserve a vital link between Native children and their community that has 
too frequently been severed.”199 
In contrast to the Obama administration’s proposed suggestion that the 
solution to historical unjust application of the ICWA lies in increased federal 
governmental intervention in state juvenile and domestic relations courts, 
other organizations have agreed that the time has come to amend the ICWA. 
One such organization, the Coalition for the Protection of Indian Children 
and Families (CPICF), states that its “mission is to successfully advocate for 
reasonable and timely amendments to the Indian Child Welfare Act in order 
to ensure Indian children and families are free from unnecessary pain and 
suffering.”200 The organization believes that “children of Indian descent will 
be granted greater access to loving, permanent homes regardless of heritage 
by minimizing the barriers caused by the Indian Child Welfare Act.”201 To 
protect children who have Native American heritage and their families, 
amendments must be made to the Indian Child Welfare Act. Proposed 
amendments include: 
1. Ensure an Indian child has a “parent” as defined by the law 
and the parent has properly established paternity under state 
law. 
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2. Provide fit birth parents of Indian children the right to choose 
healthy guardians or adoptive parents for their children 
without concern for heritage. 
3. Ensure that the “qualified expert witness” is someone who is 
able to advocate for the well-being of the Indian child, first 
and foremost. 
4. Clarify that the ICWA [applies] to family court disputes, not 
just divorce proceedings, over Indian children. 
5. Clarify that the ICWA allows transfer only of foster care and 
termination proceedings and that transfer motions must be 
filed within 30 days from the start of the proceeding. 
6. Clarify that an Indian birth mother does not need to consent 
to adoption in court. 
7. Limit a parent’s right to revoke to 30 days versus the current 
practice allowing birth parents to revoke their consent up to 
12 months after a child has been placed. 
8. Clarify that final adoptions may only be vacated for fraud 
within limits under state law. The ICWA currently gives 
parents two years. There are adoptive parents who are 
terrified for two years after the adoption is final due to this 
requirement. 
9. Define “good cause” to allow for the birth parent’s preference, 
lack of Indian home after search, and the child’s emotional, 
physical, and developmental needs.202 
The coalition suggests that these amendments “must be made to this law to 
help ensure children of Indian heritage have the same rights as all other 
children in the United States,” and ensure they find safe, happy, healthy, 
permanent homes.203  
Amending the ICWA is an attractive solution. Statutory drafting requires 
prudent decision-making. Drafters can use vague language in order to give 
the courts a certain degree of latitude when deciding an issue. However, they 
run the risk of allowing inconsistent applications of the law throughout the 
various jurisdictions. This is exactly what has occurred with the ICWA to 
date. While courts have attempted to apply good judgment in defining what 
constitutes “good cause” for transfer, they yet again find themselves in the 
difficult position of setting precedent that will allow cultural bias to seep in 
and corrode the foundations of the law, thereby obviating its intended 
purpose, and allowing historical abuses to be perpetuated. 
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While the amendment of the ICWA would be an ideal long-term solution, 
the process can be lengthy. Rather than allowing increased federal oversight 
of state domestic relations courts, this case note suggests that state juvenile 
and domestic relations courts throughout the country follow Virginia’s lead 
in adopting an immediate harm standard when deciding whether to transfer 
a case to tribal court under § 1911(b). 
VI. CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 
“All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitable for teaching, for 
reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness.”204 Scripture, in the 
form of the Holy Bible, provides the foundation of the Christian worldview. 
Under a Christian worldview, the child is not the creature of the state, but 
rather a child of God. God entrusts parents and families to rear their children 
in a manner that is glorifying to God. Ephesians 6:4 states, “Fathers, do not 
provoke your children to anger, but bring them up in the discipline and 
instruction of the Lord.”205 By specifically instructing fathers to lead children 
in the discipline and instruction of Lord, God is making an exclusive grant of 
authority to the family, and not the civil government. However, this does not 
imply that the civil government has no role in the governance of children. 
Romans 13:4 states that the civil government is “God’s minister to you for 
good. But if you do evil, be afraid; for he does not bear the sword in vain; for 
he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath on him who practices 
evil.”206 This grant of divine authority allows the civil government to punish 
evildoers, or in the realm of child welfare, remove children from abusive or 
neglectful parents. 
The Supreme Court of the United States echoed this view in the 1925 case 
of Pierce v. Society of the Sisters.207 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice 
McReynolds wrote, “The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, 
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”208 The Pierce case 
dealt with the rights of the parents to choose appropriate education for their 
children.209 It stands for the principle that parents have a right to help guide 
their child’s development, free of unnecessary government intervention. 
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Similarly, many cases regarding the ICWA, like Thompson, stand for the 
rights of the Tribe, acting as parent, to help guide the development of Native 
children. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “while there is still reason to 
believe that positive, nurturing parent-child relationships exist, the State’s 
interest as parens patriae favors preservation, not severance, of natural 
familial bonds.”210 For Native children, this idea of familial bonds extends to 
include tribal bonds. Short of an amendment to the ICWA, courts deciding 
whether to transfer a case to tribal court under § 1911(b) should apply the 
immediate harm standard because it best balances the competing interests of 
the child and continuation of tribal culture. Further discussion of this topic 
will help to better interpret an ill-defined and often misapplied standard. 
Insofar as courts are currently split on this issue, further discussion is 
necessary in order to achieve a uniform and reliable system of justice that will 
serve the needs of children, families, and Native tribes adequately. 
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